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APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Annotated (hereinafter U.C.A.) Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) gives this Court 
jurisdiction pursuant to the Order of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah transferring 
this case from the Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to U.C.A. 
Section 78-2-2(4). 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether under the circumstances the trial court erred in granting Plaintiff. 
Jimmy Zufelt's (hereinafter "Zufelt") Motion to Dismiss. (Hereinafter "Motion"). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"A trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss is a question of law." Pleasant 
Grove City v. Orvis, 2007 P.3d (2007 UT App 74) citing to State v. Mower, 2005 UT App 
438, 124 P3d 265. As a general rule, appellate courts will not consider an issue, including 
a constitutional argument, raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial court 
committed plain error or the case involves exceptional circumstances. State v. Schwenke, 
2007 UTCA 20050791-110107. 
3 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
1. Due Process 
-Brigham Young v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2007 UT 17, Utah Adv. Rep. 66 
(2007) 
2. Inadequate Briefing 
-State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, (Utah 1998) 
-MacKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941 (Utah 1998) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. Zufelt initiated this action to recover a fraudulent conveyance. 
However, after seven (7) years of protracted litigation, the costs of litigation have long 
since eclipsed the amount in dispute, i.e., approximately $32,072.45. 
Course of Proceedings. Initially the trial court granted Zufelt's motion to strike 
Gounaris' pleadings and for entry of judgment. On August 3, 2006, the Utah Court of 
Appeals reversed and remanded that decision to the trial court for further proceedings 
consistent with the opinion. See 2006 UT App 326, a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit 2. (Hereinafter "the first appeal"). 
Zufelt filed his Motion. Because Gounaris had neither plead nor filed any 
counterclaim and only indirectly objected to Zufelt's Motion, the trial court granted 
Zufelt's Motion. In its ruling on Zufelt's Motion, the trial court excoriated Gounaris for 
his failure to adequately brief all of the legal issues. (Appellant's Brief, Exhibit 1, pp. 2-
4 
•*•-.v*nr»p. the trial court declined to permit Gounaris to have any more bites at the 
apple or to compel Zufelt to litigate on! 
Gounaris again appealer me iruu .ouii - d-as^i ; . >:t* . .:r.nn. 1(1- > *"* ;:- asked 
to address maucuuaij^. !-*-i'*f'- ; M.KI1 i^u;^. Consistent with the history of this litigation, 
Gounaris again completely ignores or at best glosses over his own shortcomings in 
seeking redress from this court for the second time. This time, Gounans argum.-n. . ;r„.tt 
he has been denied due process by virtue *•• m; i:..;, / -.;-" -~ r - : ^ -. f-Mi: Zufelt's 
Auii/: • ,u .:yaii! !• • 'n: "• ^H ' s rHi^f without accepting or acknowledging any 
responsibility for his own pleading inadequacies, oversights, mistakes and/or failures. 
Disposition Below. Zufelt filed a motion to dismiss his complain;, VJUUIJ;^ ?:-
never objected to Zufelt's Motion. Insteucu ^uui^fis :1 U:c: - -. ;-;Vi" -•v!«''1- ::"..-'Li-Iir.t: a 
motion for resci^u»r. ^fceru.ir PP y — 'lev- o r the trial court and a motion for return of 
certain monies and a request for hearing. The Court considered but declined to grant a 
hearing either on Zufelt's Motion or Gounaris' other motions." i he trial coin! then 
entered its Ruling on January 11, 2007. (Appcwani V Brief, E\h:'" 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Zufelt adopts Gounaris' Statement of Facts, No's 1-11, 13, 16-17. 
1
 Rule 7(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that a court "shall grant a 
request for a hearing on a motion...that would dispose of the action or any claim or any defense in 
the action unless the court finds that the motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or the 
issue has been authoritatively decided. Zufelt requested a decision on his Motion. Gounaris filed 
a request for a hearing on his other motions. 
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2. Gounaris filed his Brief in the first appeal on April 13, 2005. 
3. Gounaris5s first Brief fails to mention or identii) ihc januar : , . . _ ' • * 
order (hereinafter "the disbursement jruei s \. \pp^i.aiiL^ 3r\-: . r \h i^ /*h rnai 
coi;:-5 at.Li-^n/iiiL! mc Ji^burs-.^^nr M'TIIM:'- from the trial court's registry.2 
4. Gounaris5 first brief fails to mention, discuss or request relief from the 
disbursement Order. 
5. In conjunction wun me nrsi app-j.ti. oounaris filed and sought n motinn for 
stay pcuuiiiL ap'ji^ai ,-..:xuai i -; : ' :^ :>f \DDellate Procedure 8. The Utah Court of 
Appeals found Gounaris5 stay motion "deficient in several respects" and denied the 
motion without prejudice. A copy of the Court's order denying the stay viou^u :s 
attached hereto as Exhibit 1. 
6. ^cu\\iir\> ne\ .r •"lenrl.-:J v.or refiled his motion for stay pending appeal. 
7. By his own admission, Gounaris filed no objection to Zufelt's Motion for 
dismissal with prejudice, (Appellant's Brief, Statement of Facts, rurau.apu .. .
 r . : ;. 
8 Zuieit aid not ;;u: a requc:,. k>. ica; m^ -. .-. • * ' i:felt did file a 
icquw. - • : • L *-:. :.: V or or about December 13, 2006. 
Gounaris never requested or filed a petition for a rehearing of the Court's 
decision in the first appeal, ( Rule 3r> oi in: i tan KUJC- J . .
 :-eiian : " \-.*!r- ^\rr 
2
 Gounaris' first brief was filed on April 13, 2005. The disbursement order was 
granted by the trial court on January 15, 2005. (Appellants Brief, at p. 5, f^ 9). However, the 
stamped "entry date" of the order appears to be in error as it is date "3/15/05. 
6 
as for a clarification relating to the return of the disbursed monies. 
SUMMARY OF \ R i . i S a.\ , 
The trial court found uv.i i_/cicnaaiiL^. i;.sic - ; : »wv Gounaris (hereinafter 
v oiicji -b reic^vd • "ft - .iris") arguments and briefing before it were inadequate. 
The Court of Appeals may and should likewise find that Gounaris' Brief is inadequate 
and devoid of meaningful legal analysis. Gounaris :v;ici i^  i\u ^ u.a.. . .cling in 
meaningful analysis relating •. - . ..«.r«. ' .: »•. ;" • "•• ^ l^n—ed of due process. 
G ••Lin.-ri- iuu: nupv opoortiiiiities to cure his inadequate briefing, including but not 
limited to raising and identifying the disbursement order in his first appeal, filing a 
petition for a rehearing asking the court to clarii} trie rju; i: *,_ . . c -eeHng 
adequately requesting a sia\ p^idm^ ..;>pca.. posting a supersedeas bond and 
affirmat:ve!y opposing 'he motion to dismiss etc. 
Under these circumstances, Gounaris was provided many opportunities to nave \\\b 
grievance(s) considered. Because his bnciing was u<uwi i* .\ .IPJ ;.> rA' iradojuaie, he 
was not depm ea o: ..•..-. pr . i1 *:* ^ ^ •"••:•*-* now lacks jurisdiction over Zufelt and 
tins appp:0 - •!• -1""- basis that Gounaris could have obtained but failed to obtain a stay 
pending appeal. Circumstances have now changed so as to make further pi. 
appeal moot. In the interests 01 juciaia: JJ;>;K.:V.: ' -;A^ : merest of the parties, 
Gounaris MK>L • > K •^•-niiurA to bring yet another separate piecemeal appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
7 
I GOUNARIS' CLAIM FOR THAT HE WAS DENIED SUBSTANTIV E 
DUE PROCESS CAN'T BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON 
APPEAL 
Gounaris" present Brie- : •.- '!::- '-•Mefp-:- hr-forc the trial court, is inadequate. 
*.-\ppe|: -ri'^; Rrief, Exhibit 1, Paragraph 1, p. 2-5). The thrust of Gounaris' argument in 
the first half of his Brief seems to be that a reversal by the Court of Appeals "...vacates 
all proceedings and orders [including those nc lan-v . :-;nL'; :•: iu* Cr^ brief' 
dependent upon . ,!• . • ; ' • • ^  • - -1- reversed." (Appellant's Brief, p. 8).? In short, 
Cl. -nnnri;--1 present Brief again treats this Court as if it is "a depository in which the 
appealing party [Gounaris] may dump the burden of argument and research." State r. 
Thomas, 961 P.2d 2sW, Mil ( i uui i ^ 5 l 
Kd'c _-TI <:.'«'•: n . ' lar * --le- of Appellate Procedure (hereinafter "URAP") states 
that the argument in the Appellant's brief "shall contain the contentions and reasons of 
the appellant with respect to the issues presented...with citations to the authorities, statutes 
and parts of the record relied on." Most m i;.'.:.^*}:-; i liAl . - * ' - - r\x hist 
ouic ci.cuion 1 • .;.:'u:' :;•-> >\ ! ^ ?> ' 0 ^ 0 ^ : of that authority and reasoned analysis based 
on that authority." Id. at 305. Moreover, it is the responsibility of the Appellant to 
marshal the evidence, i.e., connect the dots and properly cite to the recoi J. Gounaris 
3
 Gounaris cites to Phebus v. Dunford, 198 P.2d 973 (Utah 1948) for this 
proposition. Zufelt does not disagree with this proposition. However, as a practical matter if 
Gounaris fails to specifically identify those orders within the case which are relevant to the 
appeal, particularly if a reversal ensues, then it is difficult to understand how any court is 
supposed to ipso facto include or exclude the same from a judgment or order. 
8 
Brief fails to either provide reasoned analysis or marshal the evidence.4 
The second half of Gounaris' Brief is devoted to asserting a constitutional claim 
for violation of substantive due process. (Appellant's Brief, p. 13). However, Gounaris' 
Brief fails to raise or discuss the intricacies involved in asserting and properly-briefing 
such claims, including the standard of review and especially where such claims are raised 
for the first time on appeal. Constitutional arguments regarding ...due process present 
questions of law. See State v. One 1980 Cadillac, 2001 UT 26, If 8, 21 P.3d 211 (Utah 
2001). 
Whether due process has been violated depends upon the amount of due process 
granted. See Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2007 P.3d (2007 UT 17) 
Whether Gounaris was afforded adequate due process is a question of law which may be 
explored "without extending deference to the district court. Issues, including...due 
process, are questions of law which we review for correctness. Id. citing to DA. v. State 
(State ex rel S.A.), 2001 UT App 307, ^ f 8. While the measurement of the amount of due 
process in a particular setting maybe difficult, "[t]he bare essentials of due process thus 
mandate adequate notice to those with an interest in the matter and an opportunity for 
them to be heard in a meaningful manner." In other words, due process simply requires a 
4
 This is why Zufelt was dissatisfied with Gounaris' statement of the issues and 
chose to supplement the same within the meaning of URAP 24(b)(1). 
9 
hearing before condemnation. Brigham Young Univ., at f 28.5 
Gounaris had the opportunity and obligation to raise this issue with respect to the 
first appeal. However, Gounaris failed to mention, disclose or discuss the impact or 
importance of the disbursement order in his first brief and appeal. The decision of the 
Court of Appeals reversing the district court, not surprisingly, fails to specifically mention 
the disbursement order. Gounaris argued to the district court (Appellant's Brief, Exhibit 
1, p. 2, Tf 1) and now argues to this Court that the reversal by this Court implicitly 
includes the disbursement order. However, "[ijssues that could have been raised in the 
first appeal but were not raised are waived. MacKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941, 947 (Utah 
1998).6 The reason for this is that judicial economy and the parties9 interests (emphasis 
added) in the finality of judgments are in no way furthered if the parties are allowed to 
engage in piecemeal appeals." MacKay, at 947. 
Gounaris could have likewise cured the problem which he faces if he had obtained 
5
 Gounaris, unlike the Duncan defendant in Brigham Young Univ, who was not a 
named party, did have ample opportunity to defend his interests in this civil action. "The same 
process is not, however, due everyone who comes before the court. Brigham Young Univ., ^[30. 
6
 In MacKay, the court stated that "[tjhis issue involves the district court's original 
judgment. Therefore, they [Gounaris] should have raised this issue in their [his] first appeal." 
Id. at p. 947. Not only did Gounaris properly fail to raise the issue in the first appeal, but 
Gounaris likewise failed to petition the Court for a rehearing within the meaning of Rule 35 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Judge Howard specifically stated in his Ruling that 
"...the Defendants do not point the Court to any language from the opinion of the Court of 
Appeals to support this assertion. The Court has reviewed the Appellate Court's decision and the 
Court cannot identify the language upon which the Defendants base their assertion relative to the 
return of the money." (Appellants' Brief, Exhibit 1, pp. 1-2). 
10 
a stay pending appeal. His attempt to obtain a stay was similarly deficient. This court, 
like the trial court, determined that his motion was deficient. See Exhibit 1 hereto. The 
record is replete with numerous instances in which Gounaris could have, or should have, 
cured these deficiencies-but failed to do so. Is it any wonder that the district court, 
exasperated with such deficiencies, finally and appropriately determined that Gounaris 
had already had sufficient "bites at the apple?" 
In this case, it is apparent that the trial court considered Gounaris' motions and 
memoranda to rescind all prior orders of the Court and for return of the monies and for 
disgorgement of the same. (Appellant's Brief, p. 6,116(a)). See Ruling Re: Plaintiffs 
Motion to Dismiss. (Appellant's Brief, Exhibit 1, p. 1, ^  2). The trial court found 
Gounaris' motions, memoranda, analysis and reasoning to be deficient. The trial court 
declined (and rightfully so given the protracted and costly litigation history) to divine 
what the Defendant's arguments should be and how it [Gounaris] should connect law or 
evidence with argument. Id. at p 3, If 2. Therefore, Gounaris was not denied due process. 
His claims were considered (albeit without a hearing because the court determined that no 
hearing was necessary) and rejected, primarily because Gounaris had sufficient 
opportunity, failed to carry his burden of proof, and the interests of finality and judicial 
economy so warranted. 
II THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER THIS 
APPEAL OR ALTERNATIVELY, THE APPEAL IS MOOT. 
Gounaris failed to object to Zufelt's dismissal with prejudice. Furthermore, 
11 
Gounaris' notice of appeal did not raise Zufelt's dismissal as part of the order being 
appealed7. Failure to object to the dismissal of Zufelt and to note the same in its notice of 
appeal is jurisdictional. See Jensen Intermountain Power Agency, 911 P.2d 474, 476 
(Utah 1999). The exclusion within the notice of appeal appears to be intentional and not 
a mere oversight or error in description. Without jurisdiction over Zufelt, one of the 
entities that received the funds which are the subject of this appeal, the appeal must be 
dismissed. See Brigham Young University v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 110 P.3d 678, f s 
45-46, (Utah 2005). Zufelt hereby renews his request for summary disposition of the 
appeal.8 Consequently, this issue (the denial of substantive due process) is being raised 
improperly for the first time on appeal and is therefore untimely. See R.T. Nielsen v. 
Cook, 40 P.3d 1119 (Utah 2002). 
Alternatively, Gounaris5 appeal has been rendered moot. In Richards, v. Baurn, 
914 P.2d 719 (Utah 1996) the Utah Supreme Court considered an analogous situation. 
Plaintiff, Richards, sought a decree quieting title and an order requiring specific 
7
 Rule 3(d) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure mandates that the notice of 
appeal designate the "judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed."designate the judgment, 
order, or part thereof being appealed." See State v. Valdovinos, 82 P.3d 1167 (Ut Ct. App 2003) 
encouraging appellants to reference all judgments appealed from in their notice of appeal. 
8
 Utah courts require specific objections in order 'to bring all claimed errors to the 
trial court's attention to give the court an opportunity to correct the errors if appropriate.'" State v. 
Hardy, 2002 UT App 244,f 14, 54 P.3d 645 (quoting State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993)). 
12 
performance to sell certain real property. Defendant, Baum, counterclaimed.9 The trial 
court quieted title in favor of Baum. Richards appealed but failed to seek or obtain a stay 
of the trial court's decree.10 Similar to Zufelt's motion for summary disposition, Baum 
moved for dismissal of the appeal contending that it had become moot.11 
The Richards court then went on to discuss the effect of changed circumstances or 
the elimination of the controversy, or rendering of the relief requested "impossible or of 
no legal effect." Richards, at 720. In this case, the changed circumstances are that the 
proceeds were disbursed to Zufelt and the intervenor during the pendency of the appeal 
because Gounaris failed, among other things, to obtain a stay of the disbursement Order. 
See Appellee's Statement of Fact, No.'s 3-6 above. 
Zufelt's position, like the defendant Baum contended in Richards, is that since the 
trial court entered the disbursement Order and no stay was obtained, Zufelt was free to 
treat the monies as his own.12 The Richards Court agreed with Zufelt. In this case, 
9
 In this case as Gounaris concedes, Gounaris neither filed nor asserted a 
counterclaim , 
10
 Gounaris unsuccessfully sought a stay but the Court rejected Gounaris' motion 
because it was deficient. See above Statement of Facts, No's 5-6 and Exhibit 1 hereto. 
11
 The rationale for why the appeal had become moot was "[tjhe strong judicial 
policy against giving advisory opinions dictates that courts refrain from adjudicating moot 
questions. Richards, p. 720. 
12
 Zufelt ( an allowed unsecured creditor with the largest claim in the bankruptcy 
estate of Haste's principal, Kallinikos) and the Bankruptcy Trustee( who voided a Gounaris 
transfer) obtained a judgment against Gounaris have stipulated to divide the monies between 
them 50/50. Zufelt's proof of claim will be reduced to the extent of his receipt of any funds 
from Gounaris. Similarly, if Zufelt were required to disgorge funds, Zufelt would file an 
13 
monies have been released by the Court's registry to Zufelt. Zufelt has retained 
i 
approximately one-half of these monies and the other half were disbursed to a third-
party, intervenor, a bankruptcy trustee. In the context of considering Gounaris' inadequate 
legal arguments, Gounaris must accept culpability for the Court's ruling. By his own 
admission, Gounaris concedes that he filed no objection to Zufelt's motion for dismissal. 
The notice of appeal filed by Gounaris did not raise or include as part of the appeal 
the dismissal of Zufelt (with prejudice) from the case. The Notice of Appeal states that 
"[defendants appeal from the portion of the trial court's judgment which did '...not 
require the return of the $59, 584.55 as requested by defendants' to the Registry of the 
trial court."13 Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal because 
the Court no longer has personal jurisdiction over Zufelt.14 See Brigham Young University 
v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 110 P.3d 678, (Utah 2005). 
Without jurisdiction over Zufelt, the entity that received the funds which are the 
subject of this appeal, the appeal must be dismissed. Zufelt hereby renews his request for 
amended proof of claim for an increased amount, i.e., whatever the amount is that Zufelt 
disgorges. 
13
 On March 15, 2007, Appellee filed a Motion for Summary Disposition of Appeal 
and accompanying Memorandum raising this very point. An Order by the Court of Appeals 
dated April 9, 2007 deferred ruling on the this motion "pending plenary presentation and 
consideration of the appeal. A copy of the Court's Order is attached hereto as Exhibit 2. 
14
 The trial Court had jurisdiction over Zufelt. However, when Gounaris failed to 
object to Zufelt's dismissal and the trial court granted Zufelt's motion to dismiss with 
prejudice-the Court lost jurisdiction. The court might have retained jurisdiction had Gounaris' 
appeal included the dismissal of Zufelt-it did not! 
14 
summary disposition of the appeal.15 Consequently, this issue is being raised improperly 
for the first time on appeal and is therefore untimely. See R.T. Nielsen v. Cook, 40 P.3d 
1119 (Utah 2002). 
As a general rule, appellate courts will not consider an issue, including a 
constitutional argument, raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial court 
committed plain error or the case involves exceptional circumstances. State v. Brown, 
856 P.2d 358, 359 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993) 'The trial court is considered 'the proper forum in 
which to commence thoughtful and probing analysis' of issues." Id. at 360 (quoting State 
v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). "Failing to argue an issue and 
present pertinent evidence in that forum denies the trial court 'the opportunity to make any 
findings of fact or conclusions of law' pertinent to the claimed error." Id. (quoting 
LeBaron & Assocs., Inc. v. Rebel Enters., Inc., 823 P.2d 479, 483 n.6 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991)). 
The number of cases highlighting "...inadequate briefing are legion." MacKay v. 
Hardy, 973 P.2d 941, footnote 9 (Utah 1998). Gounaris' failure to adequately brief the 
trial court on both his motions is substantiated within the trial court's Ruling. 
(Appellant's Brief, Exhibit 1). Gounaris has failed to marshal the evidence or show that 
15
 In State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358 (UT App. 1993)Utah courts require specific 
objections in order 'to bring all claimed errors to the trial court's attention to give the court an 
opportunity to correct the errors if appropriate.'" State v. Hardy, 2002 UT App 244,^14, 54 P.3d 
645 (quoting State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)). 
15 
the trial court's Ruling was "plain error. Failure to show plain error or exceptional 
circumstances (on constitutional issues) is justification for the court to decline 
consideration of those issues. See State v. Schwenke, 2007 UTCA 20050791-110107; 
State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5 (Ut Ct. App. 1996). Not only is Gounaris' Brief inadequate 
from that perspective but it is "devoid of meaningful analysis." Id. 
CONCLUSION 
Gounaris has not been and was not deprived of due process. On the contrary, 
Gounaris had many opportunities to be heard and squandered those opportunities and 
failed to adequately brief both the trial court and the Court of Appeals-both in the first 
appeal and the present appeal. Gounaris further could have protected the monies in 
question by obtaining a stay pending appeal. He failed to do that. He never objected to 
the dismissal of Zufelt and therefore, this Court now lacks jurisdiction to hear and/or 
consider this appeal. Under these circumstances, judicial economy and the interests of the 
parties dictate that the Court affirm the decision of the district court dismissing Zufelt 
with prejudice. 
DATED this 12th day of December, 2007. 
LAW OFFICE OF STEVEN F. ALLRED, P.C. 
Steven F. Allred 
Attorney for Appellee 
16 
ADDENDUM 
Exhibit 1: Order (re denial of stay of judgment pending appeal) 
Exhibit 2: Opinion 2006 UT App 326 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Steven F. Allred, certify that on December 12 , 2007, true and correct copies of 
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE were filed with the Utah Court of Appeals and 
served via first-class mail, postage prepaid, to Appellant's counsel, Nick Colesides at the 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Jimmy Zufelt, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Haste, Inc., a Utah 
Corporation; and Harry 
Gounaris, and individual, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
MH 2? 2005 
ORDER 
Case No. 20041043-CA 
Before Judges Davis, Orme, and Jackson. 
This matter is before the court on Appellants1 motion for 
stay of judgment pending appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 8. The 
trial court ordered that a supersedeas bond in the amount of 
$20,000 be posted by Appellants within forty-eight hours of 
issuance of the court's oral ruling on Appellee's motion for 
disbursement of funds. The court's oral ruling was made on 
January 5, 2005. If the bond was not posted, the court ordered 
the funds held by the court in the registry were to be disbursed. 
In order to obtain a stay of judgment pending appeal 
Appellant must show, by motion, 
that application for relief to the trial 
court is not practicable, or that the trial 
court has denied an application, or has 
failed to afford the relief which the applicant 
requested, with reasons given by the trial 
court for its action. The motion shall also 
show the reasons for the relief requested 
and the facts relied upon, and if the facts 
are subject to dispute, the motion shall be 
supported by affidavits or other sworn statements 
or copies thereof. With the motion shall 
be filed such parts of the record as are relevant. 
Utah R. App. P. 8(a) (emphasis added). 
Appellants' motion is deficient in several respects. 
Appellants have not shown that a stay was requested in the trial 
court. The issue is not even addressed in Appellants motion. 
Nor did Appellants attach any portions of the record 
demonstrating that a request was made. This court is made aware 
of the request only because Appellee concedes that a request was 
made by Appellants and that posting of a supersedeas bond was 
ordered. Since Appellants provided no information regarding the 
stay request in the district court, this court was also not 
provided with the reasons for requiring a supersedeas bond in 
order to stay the judgment. 
Appellants have also not addressed the reasons why the 
supersedeas bond ordered by the trial court is improper, nor do 
they indicate that they cannot meet that requirement. Appellants 
simply state that such a bond is not necessary. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the motion for stay of judgment 
pending appeal is denied, without prejudice to filing of a motion 
for a stay of judgment pending appeal that meets the requirements 
of rule 8. See Utah R. App. P. 8. 
DATED this day of June, 2 005. 
FOR THE COURT: 
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FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
AUG 0 3 2006 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Jimmy Zufelt, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Haste, Inc., a Utah 
corporation; and Harry 
Gounaris, an individual, 
Defendants and Appellants 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20041043-CA 
F I L E D 
(August 3, 2006} 
2006 UT App 326 
Fourth District, Provo Department, 000403084 
The Honorable Fred D. Howard 
Attorneys: John Martinez and Nick J. Colessides, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellants 
Steven F. Allred, Orem, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Davis, and Thorne. 
THORNE, Judge: 
fl Haste, Inc., and Harry Gounaris appeal the district court's 
ruling granting Jimmy Zufelt!s motion to strike Gounaris!s 
pleadings and motion for summary judgment. Specifically, 'Haste 
and Gounaris argue that the district court erred by concluding 
that the doctrine of res judicata barred Gounaris from asserting 
an ownership interest in Haste and therefore Gounaris lacked 
standing to act on behalf of Haste. We reverse and remand. 
BACKGROUND1 
1f2 Gounaris and Steven Kallinikos incorporated Haste as equal 
shareholders for the purpose of doing business as Burger Supreme, 
In 1997, Haste sold the restaurant to Richard and Connie Nuttall 
1. "When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the 
facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party." Carrier v. Salt Lake 
County, 2004 UT 98,1(3, 104 P. 3d 1208. The facts are presented 
accordingly. 
in exchange for two notes, one of which was made payable to Haste 
for $72,000 (the Note). In 1998, Kallinikos entered into a lease 
with Jimmy Zufelt, the managing member of World Plaza, L.L.C.2 
In April 1999, Kallinikos abandoned the leased premises and 
executed a note to Zufelt for $28,000 to resolve obligations 
under the lease. Kallinikos experienced financial difficulties 
and obtained a loan for $2 0,000 from Gounaris in 1999. In 
February 2000, Kallinikos assigned his interest in the Note to 
Gounaris to satisfy monies owed to Gounaris. 
%3 In September 2000, Zufelt filed a complaint in the district 
court against Kallinikos and Haste seeking recovery of monies 
owed him from the failed lease. On February 13, 2001, Kallinikos 
filed a chapter 7 petition for bankruptcy.3 The bankruptcy 
trustee filed a complaint seeking avoidance of the assignment of 
Kallinikos's interest in the Note to Gounaris. At trial in the 
bankruptcy court, Kallinikos testified that he continued doing 
business through the Haste entity after the sale of the 
restaurant. Gounaris testified that he no longer participated in 
the entity. The bankruptcy court found that no documentation was 
offered to indicate when or how Gounaris relinquished his 
ownership interest in Haste. The bankruptcy court concluded that 
Gounaris owned a fifty percent interest in the Note; was a fifty 
percent stockholder, officer, and director of Haste; and was an 
insider for purposes of the bankruptcy case. The bankruptcy 
court avoided the assignment of Kallinikos1s interest in the 
Note. 
i[4 On July 16, 2 002, the bankruptcy trustee filed a motion to 
intervene and a motion to strike the pleadings and any defenses 
filed by Gounaris on behalf of Haste in the district court case. 
The district court granted the motion to intervene. In June 
2 0 04, Zufelt filed a motion to strike or dismiss, or enter 
judgment for lack of standing, in which Zufelt asserted that the 
issue of ownership had been previously litigated in the 
bankruptcy court and that collateral estoppel prevented Haste and 
Gounaris from relitigating the issue of ownership in Haste. 
Gounaris asserted that he has always been a fifty percent owner 
of Haste, is entitled to a portion of Haste's assets, and has 
standing to litigate Haste's defenses against Zufelt's action. 
2. The parties dispute whether Kallinikos entered into the lease 
individually or as an agent of Haste. 
3. On February 14, 2001, Zufelt amended the complaint in the 
district court case to dismiss Kallinikos, in compliance with the 
automatic stay of the bankruptcy case, and instead included 
Gounaris. The amended complaint asserted that Kallinikos 
assigned the Note to Gounaris, and the assignment of the Note to 
Gounaris rendered Kallinikos and Haste insolvent. 
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f5 The district court, applying the doctrine of res judicata, 
found Gounaris had no ownership interest in Haste and therefore 
lacked standing to file pleadings or assert any defenses on 
behalf of Haste. The district court found: (1) Gounaris was a 
party to the action in the bankruptcy court, (2) the ultimate 
issue before the bankruptcy court was whether Kallinikos's 
transfer of his interest in the Note was fraudulent, but that the 
bankruptcy court heard evidence and made findings regarding 
Gounaris's ownership interest in Haste, (3) Gounaris had an 
opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the issue regarding his 
ownership interest in Haste since Gounaris testified before the 
bankruptcy court that he relinquished his ownership interest in 
Haste and provided tax returns showing relinquishment, and (4) 
the case resulted in a final judgment on the merits wherein the 
bankruptcy court avoided Kallinikos's transfer to Gounaris. 
f6 The district court also noted that, although the bankruptcy 
court's findings may not have addressed the precise issue of 
Gounaris's ownership interest in Haste with perfect clarity, 
reasonable conclusions could be drawn from the testimony and 
evidence presented before the bankruptcy court that Gounaris has 
no ownership interest in Haste. The district court granted 
Zufelt's motion to strike Gounaris's pleadings and motion for 
summary judgment. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
f7 Haste and Gounaris appeal the district court's ruling 
granting Zufelt's motion to strike Gounaris's pleadings and 
motion for summary judgment. We review a trial court's grant of 
summary judgment: for correctness, affording no deference to the 
trial court. See Ford v. American Express Fin. Advisors, 2004 UT 
70,f21, 98 P.3d 15. A party is entitled to summary judgment if 
there is no genuine issue of material fact and "the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c). Specifically, Haste and Gounaris argue that the district 
court erred by concluding that the doctrine of res judicata 
barred Gounaris from asserting defenses on behalf of Haste. 
ANALYSIS 
The Doctrine of Res Judicata 
1f8 The district court ruled that the doctrine of res judicata, 
specifically issue preclusion, barred Gounaris from claiming an 
ownership interest in Haste and that without an ownership 
interest Gounaris lacked standing to act on behalf of Haste. 
A trial court's determination of whether res judicata bars an 
action presents a question of law. See Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. 
Newavs, Inc., 2000 UT 93,1(17, 16 P.3d 1214. We review such 
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questions for correctness, according no particular deference to 
the trial court. See id. 
1(9 "'Issue preclusion, also referred to as collateral estoppel, 
prevents parties or their privies from relitigating issues which 
were once adjudicated on the merits and have resulted in a final 
j udgment. ' " 3D Constr. & Dev. , L.L.C. v. Old Standard Life Ins. 
Co. , 2005 UT App 307,1(18, 117 P.3d 1082 (alteration omitted) 
(quoting Bricrham Young Univ. v. Tremco Consultants. Inc., 2 0 05 UT 
19,1(27, 110 P.3d 678). In order for issue preclusion to apply, 
four elements must be present: 
"[1] The party against whom issue preclusion 
is asserted must have been a party to or in 
privity with a party to the prior 
adjudication; [2] the issue decided in the 
prior adjudication must be identical to the 
one presented in the instant action; [3] the 
issue in the first action must have been 
completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and 
[4] the first suit must have resulted in a 
final judgment on the merits." 
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Tremco Consultants, Inc., 
2 005 UT 19 at 1|27) . "If any one of these requirements is not 
satisfied, there can be no preclusion." Hill v. Seattle First 
Nat'l Bank, 827 P. 2d 241, 245 (Utah 1992) . The burden of 
establishing each of the elements of res judicata is on Zufelt, 
the party invoking the doctrine in this case. See PGM, Inc. v. 
Westchester Inv. Partners, 2000 UT App 20,115, 995 P.2d 1252; see 
also Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1184 (Utah 1993) . The 
specific issues of the instant case focus on whether the second 
and third elements are present. 
KlO Gounaris argues that the issue decided by the bankruptcy 
court and the issue before the district court were not identical. 
We agree. "What is critical [in determining identical issues] is 
whether the issue that was actually litigated in the first suit 
was essential to resolution of that suit and is the same factual 
issue as that raised in a second suit." Robertson v. Campbell, 
674 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Utah 1983). 
Ull First, the findings made by the bankruptcy court do not 
factually support the district court's conclusion that Gounaris 
had no ownership of Haste. In fact, the bankruptcy court, to the 
extent it addressed Gounaris's ownership interest at all, found 
that Gounaris was a fifty percent stockholder, officer, and 
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director of Haste and that he owned a fifty percent interest in 
the Note.4 
Kl2 Second, the issue actually litigated in the bankruptcy court 
is different than the issue raised in the district court. The 
bankruptcy court addressed the issue of the avoidability of the 
transfer of Kallinikos's one-half interest in the Note to 
Gounaris and held that the transfer was avoidable under the 
bankruptcy code. The district court addressed the issue of 
Gounaris's ownership interest in Haste, and found that res 
judicata applied because the bankruptcy court heard testimony and 
made findings regarding Gounaris's ownership interest in Haste. 
fl3 The district court in its ruling noted that the ultimate 
issue before it was Gounaris1s ownership interest in Haste, and 
that while the ,r [b] ankruptcy court . . . may not [have] 
address [ed] the precise issue with perfect clarity, . . . that 
reasonable conclusions could be drawn from the testimony and the 
evidence presented before the [b]ankruptcy court which support a 
finding that issue preclusion is applicable." Issue preclusion, 
however, requires that the issue decided in the prior 
adjudication be identical to the one in the subsequent action. 
The issue of Gounaris's ownership interest in Haste is not the 
same issue decided by the bankruptcy court. The issue before the 
bankruptcy court was whether the transfer to Gounaris was 
avoidable as a preferential transfer without regard to whether 
Gounaris had an ownership interest in Haste. 
fl4 Finally, the issue of Gounaris!s ownership interest in Haste 
was not an essential issue in the bankruptcy court case. To 
avoid the transfer, the trustee was required to prove that 
Gounaris was an insider of Kallinikos, which prompted a 
discussion on Gounaris!s ownership interest in Haste. The 
determination of ownership interest, however, was not essential 
to prove that Gounaris was an insider. The bankruptcy court 
concluded that even if Gounaris did not maintain an ownership 
interest in Haste he was still an insider due to his sufficiently 
close relationship with Kallinikos. 
fl5 For issue preclusion to apply, the parties must have had a 
full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. See 3D Constr. 
& pev., L.L.C. v. Old Standard Life Ins. Co., 200 5 UT App 
307,^20, 117 P.3d 1082; see also Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. 
Newavs; Inc. . 2000 UT 93,1144, 16 P.3d 1214. The issue of 
Gounaris!s ownership interest in Haste was not the central issue 
in the bankruptcy case, and was only superficially addressed in 
discussions pertaining to the determination of whether Gounaris 
4. We address the issue of res judicata as raised by the 
parties. However, the bankruptcy court found that Gounaris had a 
fifty percent interest in the Note. 
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was an insider. Therefore, we cannot say that Gounaris had an 
opportunity to completely and fully litigate the issue. 
Moreover, "'collateral estoppel can yield an unjust outcome if 
applied without reasonable consideration and due care."' 3D 
Constr. , 2005 UT App 307 at 1(22 (quoting Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 
UT 78,1115, 99 P.3d 842). And courts "'must carefully consider 
whether granting preclusive effect to a prior decision is 
appropriate. ' » IcL. (quoting Buckner, 2004 UT 78 at 1J15) . 
1J16 The issue of Gounaris's ownership interest in Haste is not 
the same issue decided by the bankruptcy court. The ownership 
issue was not essential to the determination of the avoidability 
of the transfer, and was not completely and fully litigated. The 
circumstances of this case, along with the policy considerations 
implicated by issue preclusion, make it apparent that issue 
preclusion is inappropriate here. 
CONCLUSION 
Ul7 The hallmarks of issue preclusion--identity and centrality 
of issue and full and fair litigation--are not present in this 
case, and therefore issue preclusion is inapplicable. In so 
ruling, we do not decide whether Gounaris actually has or had an 
ownership interest in Haste; we merely note that the district 
court improperly relied on res judicata to make the challenged 
rulings. We reverse and remand to the district court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
<£tm>4-7?. 
William A. Thorne Jr 
Hi8 WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, 
Presiding Judge 
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